



CHALLENGES TO THE VALIDITY OF 
ARBITRATION ACTS 
 
Arbitration, Constitutionality of arbitration acts, Access to court 
This article examines the correlation between arbitration and constitutional law by comparing 
decisions from nine jurisdictions where there has been a challenge to the constitutionality of 
the arbitration act or an act imposing the use of arbitration. Such challenges are made in 
different ways. Sometimes they are direct, that is, a direct challenge to the core of the act; and 
sometimes they are incidental – a challenge to a constitutional guarantee connected to the 
arbitral process. The aim of the study is to assess if such challenges are a real violation of a 
constitutional right, or if this is just a tactic made by parties wishing to delay or avoid 
arbitration that they have previously agreed to. The study compares the rationale behind the 
challenges and assess the common grounds in which they were raised. Through the 
comparison, the study concludes that for compulsory arbitration there is a valid argument in 
the challenges. Nevertheless, for voluntary arbitration, although the challenges are not 
completely trivial, they do not represent a risk to the practice of arbitration; in effect, they 
appear to be more like a technique used to procrastinate the enforcement of an arbitral award. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In democratic states, where the rule of law is a fundamental guarantee, disputes are resolved 
through a judicial process. Traditionally, the monopoly of justice belonged to the judiciary, 
where courts are enshrined with the duty to solve disputes. This duty can be privatised by the 
use of alternative methods of dispute resolution, such as arbitration. In a sense, arbitration 
represents a well-received exception to the ordinary court system. Even so, in several 
jurisdictions challenges to the constitutionality of arbitration acts or to constitutional issues 
connected to arbitration have been raised. The reasons for the constitutional challenges are 
somewhat similar; they are based on the fact that the arbitration act or a piece of legislation 
imposing arbitration restrict or exclude the parties’ right to access to court. In doing so, deriving 
from such limitation, arbitration is curbing the right of natural justice which secures the right 
to be heard and the impartiality in the decision-making process.1  The argument comes in two 
                                                          
1 Frederick F. Shauer, ‘English Natural Justice and American Due Process: An Analytical Comparison’ (1976) 18 William and Mary Law 
Review 47, 48. 
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forms. The first is that the constitutional right to have access to court is being violated because 
arbitration is taking away a dispute that would originally be submitted to a court belonging to 
a country’s judiciary. The second is the violation of the constitutional principle of natural 
justice. If a claim is decided by an arbitral tribunal delivering an award that is final and binding, 
the process is not fair because the parties were not able to make an appeal and, as a 
consequence, they cannot fully present their case. There is a connection in the two arguments 
because access to courts is not just having your day in court but also having a fair procedure to 
solve the dispute, that is, the guarantee of procedural justice. In this sense, the principle of 
natural justice is a security for procedural justice.2    
The constitutional guarantees of access to court and natural justice are not strange to 
arbitration. In effect, they are part of arbitration, after all, arbitration is a procedure used to 
achieve substantial justice. Therefore, arbitration is a method to access a process to solve 
disputes akin to court litigation. Additionally, the right to be heard and the right to have an 
impartial tribunal are protected in arbitration.3 Nevertheless, arbitration, unlike courts, gives 
room for more flexible procedures and it provides a final and binding decision that is not 
normally open to an appeal.4 This means that when a dispute is submitted to arbitration, the 
exclusive jurisdiction of courts is removed from the judiciary and a private tribunal will settle 
the conflict. If a constitution assures the exclusive jurisdiction of courts to solve legal quarrels 
and, in doing so, the principle of natural justice is secured, when an arbitral tribunal substitutes 
the work of a court, this raises the argument about the unconstitutionality of arbitration in itself.  
Another problem involving the constitutionality of arbitration is the requirement of 
consent. If courts have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes and arbitration is an exception to 
such rule, consent is essential to legitimise the practice of arbitration. But if arbitration is 
imposed on one party, the exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of courts is not freely adhered 
to; on the contrary, it might be forced onto one party. That being the case, there is room for an 
unconstitutionality claim because a person cannot be forced to arbitrate a dispute and therefore, 
legislation providing for compulsory arbitration would violate a person’s right to access to 
courts.  
                                                          
2 See Nancy A. Welsh, “Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social Justice Theories” (2004) 54 
Journal of Legal Education 49, where the work of social psychologists in relation to procedural justice is analysed and in their description of 
procedural justice, an impartial adjudicator and the right to be heard are fundamental. 
3 Arbitration Acts assure the parties the right to be heard and the need for an independent and impartial tribunal. See for instance: Article 21 
§2 of the Brazilian Arbitration Act 1996; Section 33(1)(a) English Arbitration Act 1996; Article 18 of the Russian Arbitration Act 2015 and 
Act Articles 18 and 25 of the Japanese Arbitration Act 2003. Such protections are also provided for in arbitration rules such as Article 14.4 (i) 
of the London Chamber of International Arbitration Rules 2015 and Article 22(4) of the International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration 
Rules 2017 22(4). 
4 There are exceptions such as Section 69 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act which allows appeals in questions of law. 
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Arbitration is not a force of evil with a sole intention to oust the court’s jurisdiction and 
take away the fundamental guarantee of natural justice; on the contrary, if a party wishes to 
have a dispute submitted to arbitration, the party is accepting that a dispute will be decided by 
a private tribunal. This is not necessarily excluding the constitutional rights to access to court 
and natural justice. Nonetheless, if arbitration is imposed, there are grounds for a violation of 
a constitutional right. This article examines to what extent arbitration has violated 
constitutional rights. As it will be assessed, constitutional challenges, from civil and common 
law jurisdictions, were raised arguing the unconstitutionality of an arbitration act or an act 
imposing some form of arbitration. The results of these challenges were mostly in favour of 
arbitration and the courts have been reluctant to accept that in voluntary arbitration, the 
constitutional rights of access to court and natural justice are not abided. Nevertheless, when it 
comes to compulsory arbitration, the decisions did not follow the same path and there was a 
violation of the constitutional right to access to courts.  
 The study of constitutional law and arbitration is not new,5 however, a comparative 
analysis of constitutional challenges to arbitration acts or an act imposing the use of arbitration 
has not been made. Although the majority of the challenges were unsuccessful, the fact that 
this challenge has been raised in different scenarios should not be oblivious. The interesting 
aspect of the challenges is that, initially, they appeared to be something employed by 
developing economies rather than developed economies. Nevertheless, there was a shift, and 
courts in Australia, Hong Kong and Portugal had to decide claims based on unconstitutional 
aspects of arbitration. Consequently, the goal of the current analysis is to look at how the 
constitutional challenges to the validity of arbitration have been made in different parts of 
world. In doing so, it will be assessed if the challenges are a tangible violation of a 
constitutional right, or if this is just a tactic made by parties wishing to delay or avoid arbitration 
that they have previously agreed to. This evaluation will be done through a comparative study 
of case law in nine jurisdictions, using the comparative method of functional equivalence, 
which will be explained in the methodology section below. After describing the methodology 
employed, the case law from nine identified jurisdictions will be examined in two parts. The 
first part focuses on the analysis of constitutional challenges to voluntary arbitration and the 
                                                          
5 See Edward Brunet, “Arbitration and Constitutional Rights” (1992) 71 North Carolina Law Review 8; Kimberly J Mann, “Constitutional 
Challenges to Court-Ordered Arbitration” (1997) 24(4) Florida State University Law Review 1055; Jean R Sternlight, “Rethinking the 
Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and 
Due Process Concerns” (1997) 72(1) Tulane Law Review 1; Alfrédo de Jesús, “The Impact of Constitutional Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration in Venezuela” (2007) 24(1) Journal of International Arbitration 69; Ola O Olatawura, “Constitutions and Commercial Arbitration: 
Constitutionalization In General Law And Practice” (2013) 16(2) International Arbitration Law Review 56; Peter B Rutledge, Arbitration and 
the Constitution (CUP 2013); Georgios I Zekos, “Constitutionality of Commercial/Maritime Arbitration” (2014) 45(1) Journal of Maritime 
Law & Commerce 35. 
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second analyses the constitutional challenges in relation to compulsory arbitration. The results 
of the comparative analysis are then outlined showing that for voluntary arbitration, the 
challenges have some merit, but for compulsory arbitration, they seem like a tactic to delay the 
enforcement of an arbitral award. 
2 METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of the present examination is to compare decisions made in different 
countries where the object of the claim was the same, that is, a challenge to constitutionality of 
the arbitration act or an act imposing the use of arbitration. To do so, the case study will be 
decisions from nine jurisdictions where such challenge was made. The case law selection in 
this research was made on the basis of their availability and the languages spoken by the 
author,6 as well as their access through internet sources. The author has been tracking cases 
regarding challenges to the constitutionality of arbitration acts for the last seven years. This 
was done using the Global Arbitration Review newsletter and articles found in Westlaw and 
HeinOnline. In using this procedure, eleven decisions were identified, and the author accessed 
the full wording of each decision via a google search or through the respective court website.  
 In this research, the comparison will be between countries following the Anglo-
American family (United States of America (USA), Australia and Hong Kong) and the 
Romano-Germanic family (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala, Madagascar and Portugal). 
Despite the fact that the decisions come from different legal families, they all have a form of 
constitutional control in which a challenge can be brought when some piece of legislation 
offends a constitutional provision. Moreover, they all have statutes regulating arbitration, being 
either domestic or international arbitration, giving a common denominator to the systems and 
making the comparison viable. The cases are from developing and developed economies, and 
from five different continents. Examined together, they epitomise a spectrum of how 
challenges to the constitutionality of arbitration acts have been addressed across a diverse 
number of jurisdictions. 
For the collection of cases, the author identified two patterns related to the challenges to 
the constitutionality of arbitration. The first pattern claims that a part of the arbitral legislation 
is unconstitutional. This can be done through an attack to one or more provisions of the 
                                                          
6 The author speaks English, Portuguese, Spanish and French. 
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arbitration act. The ratio behind the challenges tend to concentrate on the exclusive jurisdiction 
of courts to decide disputes, and the principle of natural justice. The second pattern claims that 
compulsory arbitration is unconstitutional because parties are not freely adhering to arbitration. 
The nine jurisdictions presented case law that, when compared, show an expressive pattern in 
how challenges to the constitutionality of arbitration, being it in a common law or a civil law 
jurisdiction, have been settled. Moreover, the chronological development of the challenges is 
also relevant. The first was done in 1924 and after a long silence, they returned in the first 
decade of this century to grow steadily until 2016.7  
Of course, the case law assessed here does not reflect the only existing samples in the 
world. When doing a comparative research, language is always a barrier in any comparison, 
added to the availability of information. Thus, there are limits to examination of all cases 
regarding challenges to constitutionality of arbitration. Case law from jurisdictions besides the 
ones assessed in this article were found,8 however, the author does not speak the language 
where the case was decided, and it is not good to rely on digital translations. This is because 
languages have different roots, and as a result, legal terms that, at first sight, might be the same, 
in reality, their meaning can be completely different.9 The cases mentioned in this article were 
decided in countries where the official language is English, Spanish, French and Portuguese. 
Therefore, when translating the terms to English from Spanish, French and Portuguese, the 
conversion was made by trying to find an equivalent terminology in English.  
In relation to the research design, borrowing from social sciences, this shall be made by 
the most different system design  which ‘seeks to compare political systems that share a host 
of common features in an effort to neutralize some differences while highlighting others.’10 
This opposes a strict comparison which is not sought in this article because of data restrictions. 
It is not feasible, or at least desirable, to try to find every single decision in all countries with 
the same legal family. If arbitration is a tool used to substitute courts and to overcome the 
territorial limits of a nation, looking at just one legal family would make the international 
character of arbitration, and the comparison, less appealing. International arbitration provides 
for an opportunity to mix experiences from different legal systems in one arena. Moreover, not 
                                                          
7 The first case was decided in 1924 whilst the others were decided in: 2001, 2003, 2010, 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2016. 
8 See Jotham Scerri-Diacono & Stephanie Saliba, ‘Malta and the anti-constitutionality of mandatory arbitration: the saga continues’ (2012) 
78(3) Arbitration 226 and Giovanni Bonato, ‘Jurisprudence Étrangère: Cour Constitutionnelle Italienne, 19 Juillet 2013’ (2014) (4) Revue de 
L’arbitrage 977. 
9 Sometimes, even when the legal systems employ the same language, the legal term has a different meaning. See for instance the definition 
of stare decisis in England and USA in Peter de Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World, 3rd Edition (England, Routlege-Cavendish, 
2007), page 221. 
10 Todd Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics, 3rd edition (England, Routlege, 2008) page 70. 
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all decisions are easily attainable and available to the public. Thus, the different system design 
allows a comparison between ‘countries that do not share any common features apart from the 
political outcome to be explained and one or two of the explanatory factors seen to be important 
for that outcome.’11 With this design, what will be compared is the rationale behind the 
decisions  where there was challenge to the constitutionality of arbitration and the decisions 
challenging the constitutionality of compulsory arbitration. 
The method for comparison will be the functional equivalence, meaning that despite the 
differences in legal systems, there are institutions in each system serving a similar function.12 
Arbitration, in different jurisdictions, has a similar function: that is to provide an alternative 
form of dispute resolution, thus ousting the exclusive jurisdiction of local courts. Moreover, 
the constitutional challenges to the validity of arbitration were attacking the right to access to 
court or a right to natural justice. Therefore, to look at the functionality of the issues being 
compared – that is, the challenges to the validity of arbitration acts or acts imposing arbitration 
– the article will assess their purpose and utility and see if there are any concrete reasons to 
raise a constitutional challenge to arbitration. 
3 CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO VOLUNTARY 
ARBITRATION 
The challenges made to voluntary arbitration started early in the last century, the first one being 
in the USA. In this century, the challenges expanded to Latin America, Asia, Africa and 
Australia. The scope of the challenges was the violation of the rights to access to courts and 
natural justice. They occurred in different ways as each country has specific procedures for 
constitutional challenges. The claims varied in topics, ranging from the removal of court’s 
exclusive jurisdiction to rule disputes, the right to appeal and the right to present your case or 
defend yourself. The argument seems to follow a pattern that arbitration takes away a 
fundamental right to access to court. As this constitutional right is guaranteed in several 
constitutions, it should not come as a surprise that arguing the violation of this right could be 
raised in legal systems originating from different legal families. Be that as it may, although 
each court, in its respective jurisdiction, rejected the constitutional challenge, it is interesting 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 
12 See Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd edn (Oxford University Press 1998) and Ralph Michaels, “The 
Functional Method of Comparative Law”, in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 
(Oxford University Press 2006). 
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that they were not raised in the same manner. Therefore, in this section, the cases related to 
challenges to the constitutionality of voluntary arbitration will be analysed. The description of 
the cases will focus on the decision’s rationale and, where possible, the procedure will be 
explained. 
3.1 The USA Supreme Court and the New York State Arbitration Act 
Starting with the earliest case, in 1924, the USA Supreme Court decided whether the New York 
State Arbitration Act was constitutional. In Red Cross Line v Atlantic Fruit Co13 a dispute arose 
out of a charter in which the ship’s master did not perform the voyage with the utmost dispatch 
and, as a result, parts of the payment should have been returned. The New York State 
Arbitration Act 1920 allowed parties to have disputes submitted to arbitration; however, the 
New York Court of Appeals found that the dispute should be submitted to courts instead of 
arbitration as it was a question of admiralty. According to the Article III, section 2 of the USA 
Constitution and § 256, cl. 3, of the Judicial Code, such disputes were of the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the admiralty courts.14 The Supreme Court understood that the New York law 
was valid and the state could compel parties to “specifically perform an agreement for 
arbitration which is valid by the general maritime law, as well as by the law of the state, which 
is contained in a contract made in New York and which, by its terms, is to be performed there”. 
The Supreme Court went further and declared that the New York State Act did not change 
“substantive maritime law or to deal with the remedy in courts of admiralty”. This attempt pre-
dates the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act which was not subjected to constitutional 
challenges. 
3.2 Brazil and the ex officio constitutional challenge 
Moving to South America, in Brazil, the case of M.B.V. Commercial & Export Management 
Establishment v Resil Indústria e Comércio LTDA15 required the Supreme Federal Court to 
assess if the first Brazilian Arbitration Act (BAA) violated the Brazilian Constitution. The case 
involved a recognition of an arbitral award issued in Spain. Once the award was presented in 
                                                          
13 264 U.S. 109 (1924). 
14 Article III, 2 of the Constitution says: “Section 2. 1: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United 
States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State; —between Citizens 
of different States, —between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens 
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects..” Section 256 of the Judicial Code provides: “The jurisdiction vested in the courts of the 
United States […] shall be exclusive of the courts of the several states.” 
15 Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Award (Agravo em Sentença Estrangeira), SE-AgR 5206/EP–ESPANHA, Full Court of the Supreme 




court, the parties did not challenge its recognition, however, the Supreme Federal Court raised 
a constitutional challenge on an incidental basis.16 The view was that Articles 6 sole paragraph, 
7, 41 and 42 of the BAA17 were not in line with Article 5, XXXV of the Brazilian Constitution, 
which provides for the principle of natural justice.18 The argument was raised by Justice 
Pertence, the reporting justice. His rationale was that arbitration represents the right to renounce 
court jurisdiction and, therefore, it could not be done before the dispute starts, only after it. 
Consequently, arbitration per se was constitutional, but the specific performance of the 
arbitration agreement was not. Three other justices followed Justice Pertence’s view. However, 
the majority of the Supreme Federal Court understood that the BAA did not deprive parties 
from their right to access to courts. The prevailing view was raised by Justice Jobin and 
followed by the remaining justices. The conclusion was that the BAA has several provisions 
regulating how courts can interact with the arbitral procedure and, therefore, the sovereignty 
of the domestic court’s jurisdiction, to have the final say, is preserved. Justice Jobin asserted 
that Article 5, XXXV is not addressed to private parties, but to the legislator, meaning that the 
legislator cannot create laws that will “exclude any injury or threat to a right from the 
consideration of the Judicial Power”. The Brazilian case is peculiar in itself as the challenge 
was made ex officio, in a case where parties were in favour of the recognition of a foreign 
arbitral award. This is not a situation whereby one party is trying to avoid the result of 
                                                          
16 In Brazil, the constitutionality of a law can be challenged in two ways. The first is directly, having an erga omnes effect, through a claim 
arguing that a statute is unconstitutional (Article 102, I, a of the Brazilian Constitution declares: “The supreme federal court is responsible, 
essentially, for safeguarding the Constitution, and it is within its competence: I – to institute legal proceeding and trial, in the first instance, 
of: a) direct actions of unconstitutionality of a federal or state law or normative act). The second is incidentally through cases submitted to the 
Supreme Federal Court having an effect between the parties only (Article 102, III of the Brazilian Constitution declares: III – to judge, on 
extraordinary appeal, cases decided in a sole or last instance, when the decision appealed: a) is contrary to a provision of this Constitution; b) 
declares a treaty or a federal law unconstitutional; c) considers valid a law or act of a local government contested in the light of this 
Constitution; d) considers valid a local law challenged in the light of a federal law).  
17 The wording of the articles is: “Article 6. If the parties shall not previously agree on the form for instituting arbitral proceedings, the 
interested party shall notify the other party by mail or through any other means of communications (with return receipt requested) of its intent 
to commence arbitral proceedings, setting a date, time and venue for signing the arbitration agreement. Sole Paragraph: In the event the notified 
party shall fail to appear or if it shall refuse to sign the arbitration commitment, the other party shall have the right to file a lawsuit, as provided 
for in Article 7 of this Law, at the Judiciary Branch which originally would have had jurisdiction over the case.” “Article 7. If there shall be 
an arbitration clause but there shall be controversy as to the commencement of such arbitral proceedings, the interested party may request the 
other party be summoned to appear in Court to officially file arbitration proceedings, whereas the Judge shall order a special hearing to that 
end. § 1. The plaintiff shall specify in detail the subject matter of the arbitration, attaching to its motion the document containing the arbitration 
clause. § 2. If the parties shall attend the hearing, the Judge shall first attempt to reconcile the parties in dispute. In not succeeding, the Judge 
shall attempt to persuade the parties to sign, by mutual consent, the filing of the arbitration commitment proceeding. § 3. If the parties shall 
disagree on the terms of the proceeding commitment filed, the Judge, subsequent to hearing the defendant, shall decide on the contents thereof, 
either at the same hearing or within ten (10) days in accordance with the provisions of the arbitration clause, while taking into account the 
provisions of Articles 10 and 21, § 2 of this Law. § 4. If the arbitration clause shall not have any provisions for the appointment of arbitrators, 
the Judge, subsequent to hearing the parties, shall rule thereon and shall have the right to appoint a sole arbitrator to settle the dispute. § 5. 
Should the plaintiff, without good cause, fail to attend the hearing called for drafting the arbitration commitment then, the case shall be 
terminated without judgment on merits. § 6. Should the defendant fail to attend a hearing, the Judge, subsequent to hearing the plaintiff, shall 
have the right to establish the wording of the arbitration commitment to be installed and appoint a sole arbitrator. § 7. The ruling granting the 
motion shall have the effectiveness of a proceeding filed as an arbitration commitment.” “Article 41. Articles 267, item VII; 301, item IX and 
Article 584, item III of the Code of Civil Procedures, shall henceforth have the following wording: Art. 267 VII – by the arbitration convention; 
Art. 301 IX – arbitration convention; Art. 584. III – an arbitral award and a homologation arbitral award of settlement or conciliation”; “Article 
42. Article 520 of the Code of Civil Procedures shall have a new item with the following wording: Art. 520. VI – consider the request for 
arbitral proceedings has grounds.” 
18 Article 5, XXXV of the Brazilian Constitution states that “the law shall not exclude any injury or threat to a right from the consideration 
of the Judicial Power”. 
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arbitration; on the contrary, it was a case that showed some reluctance from the Brazilian 
Judiciary to accept arbitration. 
3.3 Arbitral procedure and the Mexican Constitution 
A few years after the Brazilian decision, another Latin American country experienced a 
constitutional challenge to its arbitration act. In Mexico, this was materialised in relation to 
Article 1435 of the Mexican Commercial Code.19 This article is part of Title IV of the 
Commercial Code which regulates commercial arbitration in Mexico. The article provides that 
parties are free to agree on the procedure employed by the arbitral tribunal and in the absence 
of an agreement, the tribunal can direct the arbitration in a manner that it considers appropriate. 
Moreover, it determines that such power includes the capacity to determine the value, the 
admissibility and the pertinence of evidence.20 The argument was that Article 1435 violated 
Article 14 of the Mexican Constitution, which provides for the following rights: non-
retroactivity of law, liberty, property, legality in criminal law and the right to have reasoned 
judgments and decisions. 21 The claimants argued that the right to not be deprived of their 
liberty, properties or rights without a trial by courts where the essential formalities and 
proceedings established by law are followed were being violated. The claim was that once an 
arbitral tribunal is able to establish a procedure that it deems appropriate, it is disrespecting the 
Constitution because parties have the right to proper procedures established by law, instead of 
procedures agreed by the parties. 
The Mexican Supreme Court rejected the claim. It stated that although Article 1435 did 
not address the essential formalities of proceedings established by law, the articles following 
Article 1435, which are part of Title IV of the Commercial Code, secured the essential 
formalities as they determine that the procedure must treat parties equally, that each party must 
be given an opportunity to present its case, that parties can agree on the place and language of 
the proceedings, that parties can agree the deadlines to present evidence and to present written 
arguments, that parties can agree upon the dates for the hearings and that parties can nominate 
                                                          
19 Amparo en Revisión 759/2003, decided on 30 June 2004. 
20 The wording of article 1435 is: “Subject to the provisions of this title, the Parties shall be free to agree the procedure that is to be used by 
the arbitral tribunal in its proceedings. In the absence of agreement, the arbitral tribunal may, subject to the provisions of this title, direct the 
arbitration in the manner considered appropriate. This faculty conferred on the arbitral tribunal includes determining the admissibility, 
relevance and value of evidence.”  
21 The wording of Article 14 is: “No law will have retroactive effect in detriment of any person. No one can be deprived of his freedom, 
properties or rights without a trial before previously established courts, complying with the essential formalities of the proceedings and 
according to those laws issued beforehand. With regard to criminal trials, it is forbidden to impose any penalty which has not been expressly 
decreed by a law applicable to the crime in question, arguing mere analogy or majority of reason. In civil trials, final sentence must agree with 




experts.22 Such rules reflect the right of due process and, in the language of the Mexican 
Constitution, “the essential formalities of the proceedings”. Here the challenge was somewhat 
weak. In a way, it would be anomalous to envisage that the Mexican legislator would create a 
dispute resolution procedure which is not protected by due process rules. Moreover, as the 
Mexican Supreme Court explained, such rules are guaranteed in the Mexican arbitral 
legislation. 
3.4 Consent with multiple parties in Colombia 
Eleven years after the Mexican decision, in ISAGEN S.A.E.S.P. v Sección Tercera del Consejo 
de Estado y Tribunal de Arbitramento de la Cámara de Comercio Internacional,23 the 
Colombian Supreme Court ruled on a constitutional challenge coming out of a consortium of 
companies that, in 1995, concluded a contract to build a hydroelectric power plant in Río la 
Miel. The contract was initially concluded between Hidroeléctrica La Miel SA (which was a 
mixed joint stock company, but this company was eventually succeeded by Fiduciaria Anglo 
SA in 1997, Lloyds Trust S.A. in 2000 and, in 2004, by ISAGEN SA) and a consortium which 
was initially composed of five companies (Construtora Norberto Odebrecht SA, Grupo 
Mexicano de Desarrollo SA, Asea Brown Boveri Limitada, Abb Sae Sadelmi SPA, and 
Kvaerner Energy AS). This consortium’s structure changed throughout the performance of the 
contract and by the time the construction was over, it comprised three companies.24 The 
original contract had a mediation followed by arbitration clause. But in 2004, the parties to the 
contract, which were ISAGEM S.A. and the consortium (being it Construtora Norberto 
Odebrecht SA, Alstom Brasil Ltda, ABB SAE Sadelmi SPA and Kvaerner Energy AS) signed 
an addendum to remove the possibility of mediation, leaving arbitration as the sole method of 
dispute resolution. Although the company ABB SAE Sadelmi SPA was featured in the 
consortium, in 2004, such company no longer existed because it went through corporate 
changes and in 2000, it became Alstom Power Italia SPA.25 The consortium started arbitration 
against ISAGEM S.A. for breach of contract and eventually an award was challenged in the 
Colombian Courts. ISAGEN S.A. argued that it received no information about the changes in 
relation to the signatories of the arbitration clause. Because of this lack of information, 
                                                          
22 See Articles 1434 to 1443 of the Mexican Commercial Code. 
23 Sentencia SU500/15, Expediente T-4.230.220, La Sala Plena de la Corte Constitucional, decided on 06 August 2015. 
24 In 1998, ABB Sae Sadelmi SPA transferred its business to ABB Industria SPA which changed, in the same year, its name to ABB Sadelmi 
SPA, and in 2000, became Alstom Power Italia SPA. Asea Brown Boveri Limitada, in 2000, changed its name to ABB Alstom Power Brasil 
Ltda. In, 2002, ABB Alstom Power Brasil Ltda changed its name to Alstom Brasil Ltda. In 2002, Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo SA assigned 
it rights in the consortium to Norberto Odebrecht SA. In the end, there were three parties composing the consortium, they were: Construtora 
Norberto Odebrecht SA, Alstom Brasil Ltda. and Kvaerner Energy AS. 




ISAGEN claimed that it was induced to a manifest error that was the conclusion of an 
arbitration agreement with a party that did not exist. Thus, the arbitration agreement was not 
valid because the parties could not have given proper consent to arbitrate since one of the 
parties did not exist. In this sense, ISAGEM argued that the award violated Article 116 of the 
Colombian Constitution which allows arbitrators to administer justice, as long as the parties 
have given them power to act in such way.26 Because the Constitution requires the authorisation 
of the parties to legitimise the removal of the Colombian Courts’ jurisdiction, the argument 
was that if a party that did not exist signed an arbitration agreement, an award issued in relation 
to the arbitration deriving from this agreement is a direct violation of Article 116.   
The Colombian Supreme Court did not identify an offence to the Constitution. This was 
because the parties had consented to arbitration from the conclusion of the addendum which 
met the requirements for its validity, that is, consent, object and cause. ISAGEN expressed its 
willingness to submit contractual disputes to arbitration without any contractual mistake or a 
misrepresentation. In effect, the Colombian Supreme Court considered that after the 
addendum’s conclusion, Alstom Power Italia SPA had agreed to its wording, which dismissed 
any doubt about the legitimacy of the arbitration agreement. Therefore, no offense to the 
constitution was found, on the contrary, as the consent was not tainted, the arbitral tribunal was 
formed according to Article 116. This was a feeble challenge. The claimant, after taking part 
in an unsuccessful arbitration, tried to argue that it never consented for disputes to be submitted 
to arbitration.  
3.5 Judicial power of arbitral tribunals in Australia 
Moving away from Latin America, in TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v The Judges 
of the Federal Court of Australia,27 the High Court of Australia dismissed a constitutional 
challenge that the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model 
Law), which was incorporated to the Australian legal system by the International Arbitration 
Act 2010 (IAA), was incompatible with Chapter III of the Australian Constitution. Chapter III 
of the Australian Constitution, titled ‘The Judicature’, has 10 Sections covering the following 
points: Judicial Power and Courts; Judges' Appointment, Tenure, and Remuneration; Appellate 
Jurisdiction of High Court; Appeal to Queen in Council; Original Jurisdiction of High Court; 
Additional Original Jurisdiction; Power to Define Jurisdiction; Proceedings Against 
                                                          
26 Article 116 states: “Individuals may be entrusted temporarily with the function of administering justice as jurors in criminal proceedings, 
as mediators or as arbitrators authorized by the parties to issue verdicts in law or in equity in the terms defined by an Act.”  
27 [2013] HCA 5 
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Commonwealth or State; Number of Judges and Trial by Jury. The dispute originated from a 
distribution agreement between TCL and Castel. When an award was brought to the Australian 
Courts for enforcement, TCL raised the constitutional challenge relying on the fact that Section 
16(1) of the IAA,28 which gave force of Law to the Model Law, provides for the exercise of 
the judicial power of the Commonwealth in a way that conflicts with Chapter III of the 
Australian Constitution. There was no argument against a specific provision of the Australian 
Constitution; the claim was that Articles 35 and 36 of the Model Law were incompatible with 
Chapter III of the Australian Constitution.29 The objection was that both articles would stop 
the Federal Court from refusing enforcement of an award in relation to an error of law, violating 
its institutional integrity. The constitutional challenge can be summarised in two points: the 
first is the fact that once awards could be enforced as a judgement in Australia, judicial powers 
were being given to arbitral tribunals; the second is that the IAA removed powers from the 
Australian Courts as the courts then had to enforce an award regardless of the fact that the 
award might contain an error of law. In addition, it was claimed that an award being enforced 
by the Federal Court, with a legal error, should be corrected in accordance with Article 28 of 
the Model Law,30 or there is an implied term in arbitration agreement governed by Australian 
Law that the arbitral tribunal’s authority is limited by the correct application of the law. Thus, 
such review – an appeal on an error of law – was required to avoid the conflict with Chapter 
III of the Australian Constitution. 
                                                          
28 It provides: “Model Law to have force of law (1) Subject to this Part, the Model Law has the force of law in Australia.” 
29 The wording of the Model Law provisions is: “Article 35 - Recognition and enforcement 1. An arbitral award, irrespective of the country 
in which it was made, shall be recognized as binding and, upon application in writing to the competent court, shall be enforced subject to the 
provisions of this article and of article 36. 2. The party relying on an award or applying for its enforcement shall supply the duly authenticated 
original award or a duly certified copy thereof, and the original arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 or a duly certified copy thereof. 
If the award or agreement is not made in an official language of this State, the party shall supply a duly certified translation thereof into such 
language.” “Article 36 - Grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement 1. Recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective of 
the country in which it was made, may be refused only: (a) at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, if that party furnishes to the 
competent court where recognition or enforcement is sought proof that: (i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 was 
under some incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, 
under the law of the country where the award was made; or (ii) the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of 
the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitrator proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iii) the award deals with a 
dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the 
scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so 
submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or (iv) the 
composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, 
was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or (v) the award has not yet become binding on the parties 
or has been set aside or suspended by a court of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made; or (b) if the court finds 
that: (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of this State; or (ii) the recognition or 
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of this State. 2. If an application for setting aside or suspension of an award 
has been made to a court referred to in paragraph (1) (a) (v) of this article, the court where recognition or enforcement is sought may, if it 
considers it proper, adjourn its decision and may also, on the application of the party claiming recognition or enforcement of the award, order 
the other party to provide appropriate security.” 
30 “Article 28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute (1) The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with such rules of law 
as are chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Any designation of the law or legal system of a given State shall be 
construed, unless otherwise expressed, as directly referring to the substantive law of that State and not to its conflict of laws rules. (2) Failing 
any designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable. 
(3) The arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur only if the parties have expressly authorized it to do so. (4) 
In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade 
applicable to the transaction.” 
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All submissions were rejected. The High Court understood that arbitration was 
consensual and private, therefore, when an arbitral tribunal is ruling, the exercise of power is 
private and not judicial, there is, accordingly, no violation of the institutional integrity of the 
Federal Court. Concerning the error of law, Hayne J, Crennan J, Kiefel J and Bell J decided 
that the capacity to set aside an award in such cases “was an exception to the general rule 
concerning the finality of awards, and that it operated in haphazard and anomalous ways”.31 
As a result, the absence of a provision specifying that an award can be set aside for error on the 
face of the award “does not distort judicial independence when a court determines the 
enforceability of an award.”32 Moreover, it was concluded that judicial independence means 
independence from the legislative and executive branches of government, which “does not 
compel the federal legislature to balance the ‘rival claims of finality and legality in arbitral 
awards’ in any particular way”. The High Court concluded that: “determination of the 
enforceability of an award, upon criteria which do not include a specific power to review an 
award for error, serves the legitimate legislative policy of encouraging efficiency and 
impartiality in arbitration and finality in arbitral awards.”33 In relation to Article 28, French CJ 
and Gageler J ruled that this provision refers to party autonomy to determine the rules of law 
to be applied but not if they will be correctly employed. As to the implied term in the arbitration 
agreement, in a similar manner, the High Court stated that “it is neither the effect of Art 28 of 
the Model Law nor an implied term of an arbitration agreement governed by Australian law 
that the arbitral tribunal must reach a correct conclusion on a question of law within the scope 
of the submission to arbitration.”34    
It is understandable that arbitral tribunals lack judicial powers because they cannot 
enforce their decisions, but ultimately, an arbitral tribunal is providing justice to the parties, 
which is a feature of judicial power. Moreover, an arbitral tribunal can solve a dispute, not only 
because of the agreement between the parties but also because a statute permits the parties to 
do so. Submitting disputes to arbitration does not necessarily usurp the power of courts or 
diminish those of the judiciary; on the contrary, as long as enforcement of the award is done 
by the judiciary, this removal of court’s jurisdiction is not present. 
                                                          
31 (n 33) paragraph 104. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 (n 33) paragraph 17. 
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3.6 The right to appeal in Honk Kong 
In Hong Kong, the Court of Appeal was also faced with a challenge to the validity of the 
Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 609). The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of the People’s Republic of China is the constitutional document in Hong Kong.35 It is 
a result of the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question 
of Hong Kong.36 The Joint Declaration provided that the People’s Republic of China declared 
basic policies in Hong Kong,37 and that such basic policies would be stipulated in a Basic 
Law.38 Annex I of the Joint Declaration established some of the Basic Law principles, being 
amongst them, that in the hierarchy of laws, the Basic Law was the highest law in Hong Kong.39 
Article 82 of the Basic Law provides that the “[t]he power of final adjudication of the Hong 
                                                          
35 In NG KA Ling and Another v. The Director of Immigration [1999] HKCFA 72, the Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region recognised the constitutional character of the Basic law. Chief Justice Li, at paragraph 10, stated that “[t]he Basic Law 
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China was enacted pursuant to Article 31. It was adopted by the 
National People's Congress and was promulgated on 4 April 1990. It became the constitution of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
upon its establishment on 1 July 1997 when China resumed the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong.” And at paragraph 73, he said: “We 
must begin by recognizing and appreciating the character of the document. The Basic Law is an entrenched constitutional instrument to 
implement the unique principle of "one country, two systems". As is usual for constitutional instruments, it uses ample and general language. 
It is a living instrument intended to meet changing needs and circumstances.” However, the view is not absolute, and it has been contested, 
see Lo Pui Yin, The Judicial Construction of Hong Kong’s Basic Law (Hong Kong University Press 2014) Chapter 2. 
36The full text of the Joint Declaration can be found in ‘Official Publication: Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong’ 
(1984) 7 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 139. 
37 Point number 3 of the Joint Declaration provides: “The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that the basic policies of the 
People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong are as follows: (1) Upholding national unity and territorial integrity and taking account of 
the history of Hong Kong and its realities, the People's Republic of China has decided to establish, in accordance with the provisions of Article 
31 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region upon resuming the exercise of 
sovereignty over Hong Kong. (2) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be directly under the authority of the Central People's 
Government of the People's Republic of China. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except 
in foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People's Government. (3) The Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region will be vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The laws currently in 
force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged. (4) The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be composed 
of local inhabitants. The chief executive will be appointed by the Central People's Government on the basis of the results of elections or 
consultations to be held locally. Principal officials will be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
for appointment by the Central People's Government. Chinese and foreign nationals previously working in the public and police services in 
the government departments of Hong Kong may remain in employment. British and other foreign nationals may also be employed to serve as 
advisers or hold certain public posts in government departments of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. (5) The current social and 
economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of 
speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic 
research and of religious belief will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private property, ownership of 
enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will be protected by law. (6) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
will retain the status of a free port and a separate customs territory. (7) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the status 
of an international financial centre, and its markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures will continue. There will be free flow of 
capital. The Hong Kong dollar will continue to circulate and remain freely convertible. (8) The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
will have independent finances. The Central People's Government will not levy taxes on the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. (9) 
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may establish mutually beneficial economic relations with the United Kingdom and other 
countries, whose economic interests in Hong Kong will be given due regard. (10) Using the name of "Hong Kong, China", the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region may on its own maintain and develop economic and cultural relations and conclude relevant agreements with 
states, regions and relevant international organisations. The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on its own 
issue travel documents for entry into and exit from Hong Kong. (11) The maintenance of public order in the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region will be the responsibility of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.” 
38 Point number 3 (12) of the Joint Declaration provides: “The above-stated basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong 
Kong and the elaboration of them in Annex I to this Joint Declaration will be stipulated, in a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, and they will 
remain unchanged for 50 years.” 
39 This can be seen by the wording of the first paragraph of number II of the Annex I: “After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong (i.e. the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation 
and customary law) shall be maintained, save for any that contravene the Basic Law and subject to any amendment by the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region legislature.” A counter argument would be that the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China would be above the 
Basic Law in the constitutional principle of one country two systems. See Yin (n 41).  
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Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the Court of Final Appeal of the Region, 
which may as required invite judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the Court 
of Final Appeal.” This provision was challenged twice regarding the right to appeal on the 
grounds that some limitations to appeal in the Arbitration Ordinance are unconstitutional. The 
Arbitration Ordinance in Hong Kong regulates the practice of arbitration in Hong Kong. It was 
enacted in 2011 and  according to Section 3, its object “is to facilitate the fair and speedy 
resolution of disputes by arbitration without unnecessary expense.”40 Another aspect of the 
Ordinance is the adoption of the Model Law by giving it the force of law in Hong Kong.41     
The first challenge was made in China International Fund Limited v Dennis Lau & Ng 
Chun Man Architects & Engineers (HK) Limited.42 The case involved the enforcement of an 
award deriving from a dispute out of an architectural consultancy contract. A claim to set aside 
the award was presented to the Court of First Instance and it was rejected. This would make 
the decision final, however, a leave to appeal was presented to the Court of Appeal on the 
grounds that Section 81(4)43 of the Arbitration Ordinance conflicted with Article 82 of the 
Basic Law. Section 81 (1) gives force to Article 34 of the Model Law which provides for an 
“[a]pplication for setting aside as exclusive recourse against arbitral award”.44 Section 81(4) 
provides that “[t]he leave of the Court is required for any appeal from a decision of the Court 
under article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, given effect to by subsection (1).” In this case, 
the leave required was from the Court of First Instance where such request was not granted. 
The result is that refusing leave of appeal makes res judicata under Section 81(4) and thus, 
without room for an appeal, it brings finality to the proceedings. Since Article 82 of the Basic 
law provides that in Hong Kong, the final adjudication belongs to the Court of Appeal, the 
Court of First Instance cannot stop or refuse the leave of appeal. In deciding, the Court of 
Appeal applied the proportionality test. The test is a requirement that must be satisfied in cases 
limiting access to the Court of Appeal under Article 82. The basis for the test originates from 
two cases: Solicitor and Law Society of Hong Kong v Secretary for Justice45 and Mok Charles 
                                                          
40 Section 3 of the Arbitration Ordinance. The full wording of the Section is: “3. Object and principles of this Ordinance (1) The object of this 
Ordinance is to facilitate the fair and speedy resolution of disputes by arbitration without unnecessary expense. (2) This Ordinance is based 
on the principles— (a) that, subject to the observance of the safeguards that are necessary in the public interest, the parties to a dispute should 
be free to agree on how the dispute should be resolved; and (b) that the court should interfere in the arbitration of a dispute only as expressly 
provided for in this Ordinance.” 
41 Section 4 of the Arbitration Ordinance provides: “UNCITRAL Model Law to have force of law in Hong Kong The provisions of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law that are expressly stated in this Ordinance as having effect have the force of law in Hong Kong subject to the 
modifications and supplements as expressly provided for in this Ordinance.” 
42 [2015] 4 HKLRD 609. 
43 Section 81 states: “Article 34 of UNCITRAL Model Law (Application for setting aside as exclusive recourse against arbitral award) […] 
(4) The leave of the Court is required for any appeal from a decision of the Court under article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, given effect 
to by subsection (1).” 
44 The wording of Section 81(1) is: “Article 34 of UNCITRAL Model Law (Application for setting aside as exclusive recourse against arbitral 
award) (1) Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the text of which is set out below, has effect subject to section 13(5)—“. 
45 (2003) 6 HKCFAR 570 
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Peter v Tam Wai Ho.46 The test has three limbs: the restriction must have a legitimate aim; the 
restriction must be rationally connected with the legitimate aim and the restriction must also 
be no more than was necessary to accomplish that legitimate aim. In this case, the parties 
challenged the third limb, meaning, if Section 84(4) is no more than is necessary to accomplish 
that legitimate aim. In its decision, the Court looked at the nature of arbitration and realised 
that the limitation to leave to appeal in the Court of First Instance was in line with the nature 
of arbitration, which is to provide “speed and reduction of costs of dispute resolution by 
arbitration”. Therefore, the limitation was necessary to accomplish the aim of arbitration. 
Moreover, the Court declared that: “as arbitral disputes had to be resolved without unnecessary 
delay or expense, it was proportionate that the judge who knew about the case and who decided 
the dispute should be entrusted with the decision whether there was a reasonable prospect of 
success.” 
The second challenge occurred in Wing Bo Building Construction Company Limited v 
Discreet Limited.47 The argument was similar, that is, the role of the Court of Appeal as the 
final adjudicator in Hong Kong. But this time, instead of the enforcement of an arbitral award, 
it related to the lack of jurisdiction of courts due to the existence of an arbitration agreement. 
The dispute arose out of a contract to build 13 houses in Tseun. Although the contract had an 
arbitration clause, the construction company started legal proceedings at the Hong Kong 
Courts. The defendant challenged the court’s jurisdiction and a Master in Chambers accepted 
the claim. The claimant appealed and contended the unconstitutionality of Section 20(8) of the 
Arbitration Ordinance, which declares that once a court refers the dispute to arbitration, such 
decision cannot be subject to appeal.48 The argument was that the lack of right to appeal to the 
Court of Appeal was contrary to the provisions determining that such court is vested with the 
final power to adjudicate disputes in Hong Kong. Again, the Court of Appeal applied the 
proportionality test and assessed if the limitation in Section 20(8) is no more than is necessary 
to accomplish its legitimate aim. The aim was based on Section 3 of the Arbitration Ordinance, 
which is to “facilitate the fair and speedy resolution of disputes by arbitration without 
unnecessary expense”. Hence the court concluded that proportionality had to be analysed with 
the general purpose of the Arbitration Ordinance, which “ultimately it is a matter of the 
implementation of a policy to promote the use of arbitration, to facilitate the fair and speedy 
                                                          
46 (2010) 13 HKCFAR 762 
47 [2016] HKEC 642 (2016) 
48 Section 20(8) states: “A decision of the court to refer the parties to arbitration under— (a) article 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, given 
effect to by subsection (1); or (b) subsection (2), is not subject to appeal.” 
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resolution of disputes by arbitration without unnecessary expense, and to promote Hong Kong 
as an arbitration friendly jurisdiction.” Thus, not only the rejection of appeal, in this case, was 
in line with the aim of establishing the restriction, but the court also asserted that once the 
arbitration procedure starts, a party can persuade the arbitral tribunal that it does not have 
jurisdiction to hear the dispute and bring the claim back to court. 
3.7 The right to appeal in Madagascar 
In Madagascar, the constitutionality claim involved the right to appeal in an employment 
dispute involving the unions of workers from Air Madagascar.49 The Madagascan Labour Code 
asserts that in collective bargaining, the procedure to settle disputes is made up of three stages: 
negotiation, mediation and arbitration.50 If the first two stages are not successful, arbitration 
can be used to solve the collective bargaining.51 The subject matter of the arbitration is 
restricted to reasons why an agreement was not reached through mediation.52 Additionally, in 
the Labour Code, the second paragraph of Article 225 states that, in collective bargaining, the 
arbitral award is final and is not subjected to an appeal.53 The argument for the constitutional 
challenge was that Article 225, second paragraph, limits the right to appeal and such restriction 
clashed with the fundamental right in Article 13, sixth paragraph, of the Madagascan 
Constitution because it took away the parties’ right to present their case.54 Consequently, there 
was a request for Article 225 to be removed from the Labour Code due to its incompatibility 
with the Constitution. The Constitutional High Court rejected the challenged and concluded 
that Article 225 is constitutional. The reason was that in the three stages established to solve 
collective bargaining, arbitration is the last one, after negotiation and mediation. Therefore, 
when arbitration is reached, there were plenty of opportunities for the parties to present their 
case. In this sense, there is no restriction to the right of a party to defend themselves. The 
Constitutional High Court went further to argue that Article 95 of the Constitution provides 
                                                          
49Haute Cour Constitutionnelle, Décision n° 01-HCC/D2 du 21 octobre 2015 Relative à des requêtes aux fins d’exception d’inconstitutionnalité 
de l’article 225 alinéa 2 du Code du Travail. 
50 Article 210 of the Labour Code: “The collective dispute settlement procedure consists of three stages: negotiation; mediation; arbitration.” 
51 Article 220 of the Labour Code: “If mediation fails, the collective dispute is submitted by the Ministry responsible for Labour and Social 
Laws: either to the contractual arbitration procedure pursuant to a collective agreement binding the parties; either to the arbitration procedure 
of the jurisdiction of the labour court.” 
52   Article 221 of the Labour Code: “The arbitration can only relate to points could not be settled by an agreement during the mediation. Any 
new request that has not been submitted to mediation is inadmissible.” 
53 Article 225 of the Labour Code: “The arbitral award must be reasoned and immediately notified to the parties. This decision is final and 
cannot be appealed. It puts an end to the litigation. From the transmission of this 
decision to the parties, the strike or the lockout must end.” 
54 Article 13 sixth paragraph: “The State guarantees the plenitude and the inviolability of the rights to defence before all the jurisdictions and 
at all the stages of the procedure, including that of the preliminary investigation, and at the level of the judicial police or of prosecution.” 
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that the legislative has the power to establish procedure rules to new types of jurisdictions.55 
Accordingly, when the Labour Code created an arbitral procedure, the legislator was just 
following the rules in the Constitution and therefore, when legislating the possibility of 
arbitration in collective bargaining, no restriction was made to the right to present your case.  
The decision in Madagascar is somewhat particular because although it could be argued 
that in a negotiation and in a mediation you can present your case, they are not entirely 
adversarial procedures, hence, presenting your case in litigation is not the same as presenting 
your case in conciliatory forms of dispute resolution. Be that as it may, the second part of the 
reasoning shows that the Constitution allows the legislative to establish different forms of 
dispute resolution such as arbitration, making it weak the argument that Article 225 of the 
Labour Code contradicted the Constitution.  
4 CHALLENGES TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 
Another facet of constitutional challenges to arbitration acts refer to compulsory arbitration, 
that is, arbitration in which consent is not necessary and the procedure is imposed by law. The 
interpretation is simple: if arbitration is an alternative form of dispute resolution, imposing it 
is not constitutional because it excludes the parties’ right to have a dispute submitted to courts. 
This has occurred in Guatemala concerning a free trade agreement and in Portugal regarding 
sports and intellectual property arbitration. 
4.1 Compulsory arbitration in a Guatemalan free trade agreement 
In Guatemala, the case involving a compulsory arbitration clause originated from Decree 11-
2006, which implemented the DR-CAFTA–US Free Trade Agreement. Article 117 of the 
Decree 11-2006 added a third paragraph to Article 2 of the Guatemalan Arbitration Act.56 The 
third paragraph of Article 2 of the Arbitration Act provides that  
“[t]he controversies arising out of the application, interpretation and execution of 
international agreements between private parties, is resolved according to the 
provisions contained in the rules of arbitration of the Court of Arbitration of 
                                                          
55 Article 95: “In addition to the issues that are directed to it by other Articles of the Constitution: I. The law establishes the rules concerning: 
… the creation of new orders of jurisdictions and their respective competences as well as their organization and the rules of procedure that are 
applicable to them;”. 
56 The Arbitration Act is the Decreto Numero 67-1995, and Article 2 regulates International Arbitration. 
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International Chamber of Commerce, unless the parties expressly agree to submit the 
dispute to others arbitration forums.”  
As a result, a constitutional challenge was presented to the Guatemalan Constitutional Court 
arguing that such provision was unconstitutional.57 The reasoning was that compulsory 
arbitration did not allow parties to seek another method of dispute resolution besides 
arbitration. Therefore, parties lost their constitutional right to have disputes submitted to the 
Guatemalan Judiciary as it is guaranteed in Articles 12 and 29 of the Guatemalan 
Constitution.58 The Constitutional Court ruled that arbitration was a legitimate method of 
dispute resolution and it promotes international commerce, being in line with Articles 43 and 
119(l) of Guatemalan Constitution.59 It also made an analysis of the Guatemalan Arbitration 
Act to conclude that party autonomy was the essence of arbitration as it ousts the jurisdiction 
of the courts. However, the court’s conclusion was that since arbitration derives from party 
autonomy, imposing arbitration was a violation of the parties’ right to access to courts. 
Therefore, since Articles 12 and 29 provide for the Constitutional right to access to courts, 
paragraph 3 of Article 2 is unconstitutional because it imposes arbitration as the sole method 
of dispute resolution in international agreements between private parties. The Guatemalan 
Constitutional Court did not render arbitration in itself unconstitutional, but it asserted that the 
absence of party autonomy can make it unconstitutional.  
Consent and party autonomy are essential for arbitration, but compulsory arbitration 
does not necessarily mean a limitation to access to courts. When compulsory arbitration relates 
to disputes where inequality of arms is present, yes, that can be problematic; yet, in free trade 
agreements, there will be a presumption that “the traders” are well informed of the “rules of 
the game”. Additionally, the arbitral procedure might be one of the reasons for the free trade 
agreement and, once an award is issued under the International Chamber of Commerce rules, 
resort can be made to local courts. 
                                                          
57 Expediente 387-2010, Guatemalan Constitutional Court (Corte de Constitucionalidad), decided on 07 July 2011 by Justices Alejandro 
Maldonado Aguirre, Mauro Roderico Chacón Corado, Héctor Hugo Pérez Aguilera, Roberto Molina Barreto, Gloria Patricia Porras Escobar, 
Ricardo Alvarado Sandoval and Carmen María Gutiérrez De Colmenares. 
58 They respectively state: “Article 12: The defense of the person and his [or her] rights are inviolable. No one may be sentenced or deprived 
from his [or her] rights, without being summoned, heard and defeated in a legal process before a competent and pre-established judge and 
tribunal. No person may be tried by Special or Secret Tribunals, nor through proceedings that are not pre-established legally.” “Article 29: 
Free Access to Tribunals and Dependencies of the State. Every person has free access to the tribunals, dependencies and offices of the State, 
in order to exercise their actions and enforce their rights in accordance with the law. Only foreigners may avail themselves of diplomatic 
channels in case of a denial of justice. The sole fact that a resolution [fallo] may be adverse to their interests[,] is not qualified as such a 
denial[,] and in any case, the legal recourses established by the Guatemalan laws must have been exhausted.” 
59 They respectively state: “Article 43: Freedom of Industry, Trade, and Work The freedom of industry, trade, and work is recognized, except 
for the limitations that due to social motives or the national interest are imposed by the law.” “Article 119: [The] Obligations of the State. The 
following are the fundamental obligations of the State […] l. To promote the ordered and efficient development of the domestic and foreign 
trade of the country, promoting markets for national products.” 
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4.2 Sports and intellectual property arbitration in Portugal 
In Portugal, there were two cases involving compulsory arbitration in different areas of law. 
The first case related to sports law and originated from Decree 128/XII, of 08 March 2013.60 
This statute created the Sports Arbitral Tribunal (SAT) which embodied the competence to 
administer disputes regarding sports law or related to sport activities in Portugal. Articles 4(1) 
and 5 of the Decree’s Annex established a system of compulsory arbitration in sports disputes 
deriving from decisions of sports bodies, and also for cases of doping in sports.61 Article 8(1) 
and (3), of the same Decree, determined that the decisions from the last instance in Sports 
Arbitral Tribunal are final and not subject to any appeal, save appeals to the Portuguese 
Constitutional Tribunal.62 After the Decree came to force, the President of Portugal challenged 
its constitutionality. The Portuguese Constitution provides that the president of Portugal, before 
enacting a decree into law, has the prerogative to request the Constitutional Court to review 
any decree sent to them.63 In this case, the request for review argued that such compulsory 
arbitration violated the right to access the Portuguese courts, which is protected by Articles 
18(2), 20(1) and 268(4) of the Portuguese Constitution.64 The Portuguese Constitutional Court 
declared that the provisions in the Decree were unconstitutional. The reasoning reflected upon 
the nature of arbitration and compared the difference between voluntary and compulsory 
arbitration, stating that in the latter, the right to waive an appeal is not unconstitutional as parties 
agree upon it. However, when arbitration is compulsory, parties did not have a chance to waive 
their fundamental right to appeal. The Constitutional Court also addressed the SAT’s 
composition and its impact in the independence and impartiality of arbitrators. SAT is located 
at the Portuguese Olympic Committee, which is a non-profitable body formed of sports 
                                                          
60 Case number 279/2013, Tribunal Constitucional, Acórdão 230/2013, decided on 24 April 2013 by Justices Carlos Fernandes Cadilha, Ana 
Guerra Martins, Pedro Machete, Maria de Fátima Mata-Mouros, José da Cunha Barbosa, Catarina Sarmento e Castro, Maria José Rangel de 
Mesquita, João Cura Mariano Fernando Vaz Ventura, Maria Lúcia Amaral, Vítor Gomes, Maria João Antunes and Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro. 
61 Articles 4(1) states: “Compulsory Arbitration. It is of SAT’s competence to rule emerging disputes related to the acts and omissions of the 
federations and other sports entities and professional leagues, in the exercise of the corresponding regulatory powers, organization, direction 
and discipline.” Article 5 expresses: “Compulsory Arbitration for anti-doping. It is of SAT’s competence to rule on the deliberations taken by 
disciplinary bodies of sports federations or anti-doping authority of Portugal in the field of violation of anti-doping rules, pursuant to law No. 
38/2012, 28 August, which approves the anti-doping law in sport.” 
62 Article 8 declares: “Definitive nature of arbitration awards 1 – Without prejudice to the following paragraphs, the decisions handed down 
in only one or last instance, by SAT are not subject to appeal, since the submission of the dispute to the Tribunal implies, in the case of 
voluntary arbitration, the waiver of the same […] 3 – It is protected in all cases, the right of appeal to the Constitutional Court and to challenge 
the decision on the grounds and in accordance with the Voluntary Arbitration Act.” 
63 According to Article 278, (1) of the Portuguese Constitution the President “may ask the Constitutional Court to conduct a prior review of 
the constitutionality of any rule laid down by an international treaty that is submitted to him for ratification, by any decree that is sent to him 
for enactment as a law or executive law, or by any international agreement, the decree passing which is sent to him for signature.” 
64 The provisions declare: “Article 18. Legal Force […] 2. The law may only restrict rights, freedoms and guarantees in cases expressly 
provided for in this Constitution, and such restrictions shall be limited to those needed to safeguard other rights and interests protected by this 
Constitution.” “Article 20. Access to Law and Effective Judicial Protection 1. Everyone shall be guaranteed access to the law and the courts 
in order to defend those of his rights and interests that are protected by law, and justice shall not be denied to anyone due to lack of financial 
means.” “Article 268. Citizens’ Rights and Guarantees […] 4. Citizens shall be guaranteed effective judicial oversight of those of 
their rights and interests that are protected by law, particularly including the recognition of the said rights and interests, the impugnation of 
any administrative act that harms their rights and interests, regardless of its form, the issue of positive rulings requiring the practise of 
administrative acts that are due by law, and the issue of adequate injunctions.” 
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associations. Thus, the entity promoting and organising the settlement of disputes through 
arbitration is formed of sports bodies that will be parties in conflicts tried at SAT. In effect, 
SAT is created and maintained by parties that will use its system of dispute resolution. In 
addition, the three-member panel of arbitrators at SAT can be selected from a list fixed by 
SAT’s members, or SAT’s president can nominate an arbitrator if the parties failed to do it. 
Once a tribunal is formed, SAT’s president will also determine who will be the panel’s 
president. As a result, the Constitutional Court ruled that not only SAT’s nature limited the 
autonomy of the parties, but its procedures for the selection of arbitrators gave serious doubts 
about their independence and impartiality. After the decision, on 06 September 2013, the 
Portuguese Legislative approved Law 74, which changed Decree 128/XII, and now, Article 8 
of the Law’s Annex provides for the possibility to appeal to a local court from Sports Arbitral 
Tribunal decisions.  
In this case, there is a presumption that the athlete and the sports body are not in equal 
footing. This is because the adherence to the arbitration clause is an “in or out” scenario. If the 
athlete rejects the arbitration agreement that is imposed as a condition for their participation in 
a sports competition, the athlete cannot exercise their trade. Furthermore, the clause will be 
imposed by a sports body that controls the sport activity and its rules. That is why the 
relationship between the athlete and the sports body is not always representative of an 
equilibrium. 
In the second case, the Portuguese Constitutional Tribunal had a different view regarding 
compulsory arbitration in relation to disputes involving intellectual property.65 Law No. 62, of 
12 December 2011, established a framework of compulsory arbitration for disputes involving 
intellectual property of medicines. Article 2 of Law No. 62 stated that for such cases, disputes 
will be solved by arbitration, being ad hoc or institutional.66 The argument raised was again the 
fact that compulsory arbitration violates the parties’ right to access to courts specified in Article 
20(1) of the Constitution. This time, the question involved an appeal in an injunction aimed at 
stopping the respondent from producing, stocking, offering, possessing or introducing to the 
Portuguese market a medicament. The issue revolved in the allegedly lack of access to courts 
when it comes to injunctions in compulsory arbitrations. Following the precedent of the Sports 
                                                          
65 Case No. 763/13, Tribunal Constitucional, Acórdão no 123/2015, decided on 12 February 2015 by Justices Maria José Rangel de Mesquita, 
Lino Rodrigues Ribeiro, Carlos Fernandes Cadilha, Catarina Sarmento e Castro and Maria Lúcia Amaral. 
66 The wording of the Article is: “The disputes arising out of invocation of industrial property rights, including precautionary procedures 
related to medicines, within the meaning of point (a) (ii)) of paragraph 1 of article 3 of Decree-Law No. 176/2006 of 30 August, and generic 
drugs, whether they are concerned with patents process, product or use, or supplementary protection certificates, shall be subject to arbitration 
necessary, institutionalized or not institutionalized.” 
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Arbitration decision, the Constitutional Court realised that in this case there was, in the law, an 
option to appeal. Article 3(7) of Law No. 62 provides that the decision issued by the arbitral 
tribunal is subject to an appeal to the local court.67 As a result, there was no violation of the 
constitutional principle to have access to courts. Furthermore, the ruling addressed the fact that 
compulsory arbitration did not have a mechanism for interim measures and therefore an 
injunction could not be claimed through arbitration. This point would create a restriction to the 
right to access to court, but again, the argument was rejected as the Constitutional Court 
asserted that the Portuguese Arbitration Act has provisions for interim measures and by 
analogy, it can be used for compulsory arbitrations. This instance did not involve inequality of 
arms but procedure tools to guarantee access to courts. As a result, the question was not exactly 
about a constitutionality because in the end, the interim measure that was not present in the 
Law No. 62 could be found in the Portuguese Arbitration Act. 
4  COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 
As explained at the beginning of this article, the method for comparison would be the functional 
equivalence, meaning that despite the differences in legal systems, there are institutions in each 
system serving a similar function. Arbitration, in different jurisdictions, has a similar function: 
that is to provide an alternative form of dispute resolution, thus ousting the exclusive 
jurisdiction of local courts. Moreover, the constitutional challenges to the validity of arbitration 
were, more or less, attacking the right to access to court or a right related to it. Therefore, to 
look at the functionality of the issues being compared – that is, the challenges to the validity of 
arbitration acts – this part of the article will assess their purpose and utility and see if there are 
any concrete reasons to raise a challenge to the constitutionality of an Arbitration Act or to 
constitutional issue connected to arbitration. 
 When a challenge is made to the act in itself, it is done in a form of constitutional 
control. Accordingly, the highest court in the county is called to decide if an act passed by the 
legislative power is in line with the Constitution. Normally, such decision has an erga omnes 
effect,68 and the law is no longer valid once a decision stating so is made. From the cases 
analysed in section 2 of this paper, no challenge was successful; however, they appear to fulfil 
                                                          
67 The wording of the provision is: “From the arbitral decision, an appeal can be made to the competent court of appeal, having a devolutive 
effect.” 
68 This was not the case of the Brazilian decision as explained above in footnote no. 16. 
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the same function but in a different way. The majority had a similar focus, which was the 
exclusive jurisdiction of courts over arbitration. 
 In the USA, the question was if maritime disputes would be arbitrable. If that were the 
case, courts would have exclusive jurisdiction of such disputes and removing this prerogative 
would be unconstitutional. In Brazil, the question went further to add that arbitration not only 
removes the exclusive jurisdiction of courts, but it also violates the principle of natural justice. 
In Australia, the argument was that the Arbitration Act gave judicial power to arbitrations when 
such power should be vested in courts, which is basically saying that the courts have exclusive 
power to rule disputes. It seems that in the three jurisdictions, the function of the challenge was 
the same, that is to state that arbitration is usurping the role of the judiciary and because of that, 
the procedure will be unfair, hence the argument about offending the principle of natural 
justice. 
 The cases in Mexico and Hong Kong also had challenges to the Act in itself but this 
time, although related to the exclusive jurisdiction of courts, the cause of action was not exactly 
the monopoly of courts to adjudicate disputes. They were based on features of arbitration. Thus, 
in Mexico the right to be tried in a court was the reason for the allegedly unconstitutionality, 
however, the support was that the Arbitration Act violated the constitutional right to be tried in 
a court where the procedures are established by law. It was just a tangential claim that 
arbitration does not follow procedures enacted by the Mexican legislative, but its own rules. It 
seems like a weak argument because what would be the point of having a procedure determined 
by law in arbitration? The attraction of arbitration is that parties are free to establish the 
procedure that they would like to adopt. In effect, the Mexican decision stated that although 
arbitration is private, the law has established minimum standards for it to take place, and such 
parameters are in line with the Mexican Constitution. In Hong Kong, again, the challenge was 
to a feature of arbitration, which is the fact that arbitration does not provide for the award to be 
subjected to appeals.69 Nonetheless, connecting the right to appeal with the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to rule disputes in Hong Kong is, actually, a challenge to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Courts disguised as an offence to the right to 
appeal. 
In Madagascar, the challenge was not to the Arbitration Act but the right to appeal from 
arbitral decisions made in collective bargaining. The challenge was made to a provision of the 
                                                          
69 See (n 4). 
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Labour Code providing for arbitration as the last resort in a three-stage dispute resolution 
mechanism. The argument was that arbitration was final and it restricted the parties’ right to 
present their case. This was not a direct challenge to the exclusive jurisdiction of courts, but to 
a method used to assert the right to be heard. Be that as it may, the right to be heard is a 
guarantee provided by the right to access to court, which, according to the claimants, could not 
be properly guaranteed in arbitration. 
  The Colombian case is the variant in this sequence of decisions. There, the challenge 
was that enforcement of an award violated the constitutional right of party autonomy. This case 
was not a direct challenge to the Colombian Arbitration Act but a party wanting to find a 
tangential reason to annul an award, and for that, it employed a constitutional argument. The 
question in the case was about being a party to the arbitration agreement, not the arbitration in 
itself. The Colombian example differs from the previous samples as it really feels like a 
procedural “Hail Mary” to see if the award’s decision could be reversed. 
 The last two samples of this study are different in nature. Despite the same rationale 
being adopted, this time the exclusive jurisdiction to courts referred to compulsory arbitration. 
There was no possibility or option given to the parties: it was either arbitration or no chance of 
redress. However, this was not done by the Arbitration Act; on the contrary, it was provided 
for in another piece of legislation. In Guatemala, the law providing for compulsory arbitration 
derived from a free trade agreement that conflicted with the Guatemalan Constitution. The 
Guatemalan Constitutional Court understood that arbitration in itself was constitutional, 
nevertheless, compulsory arbitration was against the principle of natural justice and it hindered 
access to court. In Portugal, a provision in a statute establishing compulsory arbitration in 
sports disputes was considered unconstitutional in a similar argument to the question debated 
in Hong Kong, the right to appeal. When waived, the right to appeal removed the exclusive 
jurisdiction of Portuguese courts to settle disputes in Portugal. However, as opposed to Hong 
Kong, the arbitration was compulsory, therefore the Portuguese court stated that waiving the 
right to appeal in voluntary arbitration is constitutional whereas in compulsory arbitration it is 
not. In the decision regarding intellectual property, the same question was raised but the law 
provided for an appeal, therefore, there was no unconstitutionality. 
 What all cases have in common is that they challenge the fact that arbitration would 
restrict the right to access to court, or some benefit deriving from such right. There might be 
some foundation to this plea, as all the jurisdictions analysed have some provision with 
constitutional character protecting this right. This is not done randomly, the right to access to 
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court is a recognised right in international instruments.70 Consequently, the purpose and utility 
of this protection, which is to make sure that all persons have a right to obtain redress for 
violation of their rights, can be found in the legislation of the jurisdictions mentioned above. 
But when it comes to assessing the functionality of the challenges made to the validity of the 
arbitration acts, despite the basis for it, it appears that those related to voluntary arbitration are 
all a frantic attempt to avoid the inevitable, that is, the enforcement of an arbitral award. Trying 
to argue that an arbitration procedure, entered or adhered voluntarily, deprives the right to 
access to court, feels like an escape plan to avoid payment. If the arbitration agreement or the 
arbitral procedure is vitiated, it is understandable that it can be challenged; nevertheless, this 
attack can only be done on constitutional grounds if a constitutional right was not followed by 
the arbitral tribunal. If the tribunal does not permit a party to present its case, the constitutional 
right to be heard will be violated. Be that as it may, this is not an offence to an arbitration act. 
Additionally, arbitration acts tend to guarantee fundamental rights.71 Therefore, if a 
constitutional right has been damaged, there is a relief to be sought in the arbitration act as 
opposed to its invalidation. 
 The cases concerning compulsory arbitration are a little bit more tenuous. In terms of 
its functionality, the decisions recognise that being forced out of the exclusive jurisdiction of a 
court is an attack to your right to access to court. A counter argument is that although 
compulsory arbitration provides for an “in or out” agreement, the party can still say no and 
choose not to conclude the agreement. Nonetheless, life is not always that simple. In the case 
of athletes, not adhering to the agreement means not participating in the competition. It is 
almost as if the agreement limited the person’s capacity to trade. Thus, recognising that this 
rule is unconstitutional is just a form to protect the right to access to court. This view was not 
entirely shared by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). For voluntary arbitration, 
the ECtHR established that when a dispute is submitted to arbitration, there is no violation of 
the right to court.72 In relation to compulsory arbitration, in Bramelid and Malmström v 
                                                          
70 See Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights, Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 8 of the 
American Convention of Human Rights and Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
71 See Article 1042(1) of the German Code of Civil Procedure, Article 1036(2) of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure and Article 25 of the 
Japanese Arbitration Act (Law 138 of 2003). 
72 In Deweer v Belgium [1980] ECHR 1, at paragraph 49, the Court declared: “In the Contracting States’ domestic legal systems a waiver of 
this kind is frequently encountered both in civil matters, notably in the shape of arbitration clauses in contracts, and in criminal matters in the 
shape, inter alia, of fines paid by way of composition. The waiver, which has undeniable advantages for the individual concerned as well as 
for the administration of justice, does not in principle offend against the Convention.” 
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Sweden,73 the ECtHR did not say it contradicted the right to access to court but it emphasised 
that fundamental rights provided in court should be guaranteed in the arbitral procedure.74 
 Arbitration is an exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of state courts. There is no doubt 
that arbitration removes the legal procedure from the judiciary, however, this does not mean 
that access to court has been diminish. Not only during the arbitral procedure, but also, after 
the arbitral procedure, a party can resort to a local court to challenge something unlawful that 
was done in the arbitral procedure. This is the opposite of no right to access to court. Perhaps, 
in arbitration, the right to access to court might be applied in a different manner when compared 
to how it works in court litigation, but that does not signify the end of the right to access to 
court. 
5 CONCLUSION 
The examination of the decisions challenging the constitutionality of arbitration acts or 
constitutional issues connected to arbitration has shown that a similar argument was raised in 
different countries. The attempt to undermine arbitration as a method of seizing the right to 
access to court was used in legal systems deriving from either the common law or the civil law 
family. The rationale for the majority of the challenges was not based on a sophisticated claim. 
From the case studies addressed in this article, the samples involving voluntary arbitration 
resemble a “last shot” of some glory in the dispute. This can be seen in the cases from USA, 
Colombia, Madagascar and Mexico. They all tried to find a loophole to raise a constitutional 
challenge where the violation of a constitutional right was not clear, and at times, so tangential 
that it is hard to conclude that this was an offense to the constitution. In other jurisdictions, 
such as Brazil, the challenge was not made by the parties but by the court ex officio. This is a 
particular case, but the substance of the claim is very similar to the one used by parties when 
raising this argument, that is, access to courts. In this sense, the Hong Kong and the Australian 
cases provide a good example of an attempt to avoid arbitration that that the parties freely 
agreed to, without any vitiation. The first one focused on the right to appeal to the highest court 
of the land, and the second one focused on the integrity of the judiciary as it could not correct 
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74 Ibid, at paragraph 30: “Furthermore, the Commission notes that a distinction must be drawn between voluntary arbitration and compulsory 
arbitration. Normally, Art. 6 poses no problem where arbitration is entered into voluntarily ... If, on the other hand, arbitration is compulsory 
in the sense of being required by law, as in this case, the parties have no option but to refer their dispute to an Arbitration Board, and the Board 




an award based on error of law. The same cannot be said about the two jurisdictions where 
compulsory arbitration was considered unconstitutional. In Guatemala and Portugal, the idea 
that arbitration obliges the parties regardless of their consent does not go hand-in-hand with 
the right to access to court, on the contrary, it removes party autonomy and limits the right to 
access to court.  
To conclude, on the one hand, through the comparison of the cases in voluntary 
arbitration, as the result was the same in the seven jurisdictions studied, the discussion appears 
to be more academic and with no negative impact to arbitration. On the other hand, when it 
comes to voluntary arbitration, privatising justice without the parties’ consent feels like a strike 
to the constitutional right to have access to court. Even though a party can have access to 
remedies in court against compulsory arbitration, forcing someone to arbitrate clashes with the 
idea that arbitration is a consensual method of dispute resolution. The result obtained from the 
comparison is that the functionality of the challenges was the same; in voluntary arbitration, to 
delay the enforcement of the award; and, in compulsory arbitration, to recognise that imposing 
arbitration might not go hand in hand with the right to access to courts. 
 
 
 
 
 
